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| Circle in the Sand: Why We Went Back to Iraq | 
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Avg. Customer Rating:  (based on 7 reviews)
Sales Rank: 718180
Category: Book
Author: Christian Alfonsi
Publisher: Doubleday
Studio: Doubleday
Manufacturer: Doubleday
Label: Doubleday
Languages: English (Original Language), English (Unknown), English (Published)
Media: Hardcover
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 480
Shipping Weight (lbs): 1.7
Dimensions (in): 9.1 x 6.3 x 1.4
ISBN: 0385515987
Dewey Decimal Number: 956.704431
EAN: 9780385515986
ASIN: 0385515987
Publication Date: October 10, 2006
Release Date: October 10, 2006
Availability: Usually ships in 1-2 business days
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Product Description
An important, massively researched and revelation-filled work of history that uncovers how decisions made by the first Bush White House preordained the current administration?s decision to invade Iraq.
?Is this a one-time thing, or should we foreshadow more to come??
This was the prophetic question posed by National Security Adviser Brent Scowcroft in a secret April 1991 memorandum about the postwar management of Iraq, two months after the United States had defeated Iraqi forces in Operation Desert Storm?but left Saddam Hussein securely in power. Circle in the Sand challenges the widely held notion that Saddam?s survival was the result of a spur-of-the-moment decision by the first President Bush and his inner circle (especially the ?Reluctant Warrior? Colin Powell) to call off the Desert Storm campaign "one day too soon."
Through interviews with the Bush team?s principal decision makers?including President George H.W. Bush, Dick Cheney, Brent Scowcroft, and Paul Wolfowitz?as well as hundreds of never-before-revealed White House documents, Christian Alfonsi shows how Saddam?s survival was the result of a calculated decision, albeit one with disastrous consequences, which had settled the issue of how the first Iraq war would end long before it even began. Circle in the Sand also provides the definitive account of the collapse of the first Bush administration?s Iraq policy after the war.
Unprecedented in its detail about the decision making inside the Bush White House during the first Gulf War, Circle in the Sand provides not only a dramatic portrait of history in the making but also a compelling rationale for the United States? mishandling of the current situation in Iraq. Did we invade Iraq in 2003 to ensure that George W. Bush would not suffer an electoral fate in 2004 similar to his father?s defeat in 1992? Circle in the Sand forces us to consider that disturbing scenario and its larger implications for the American war on terror.
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| Customer Reviews: Read 2 more reviews...
 Why both Bush presidents waged war with Iraq May 11, 2007
2 out of 2 found this review helpful
With deliberation, Christian Alfonsi traces events preceding and following the first Bush's 1991 war to force Iraq out of Kuwait and proceeds to analyze how his administration's policy weaknesses and "victory fatigue" led to the subsequent 2003 invasion of Iraq on George W. Bush's watch.
Alfonsi cites mainly public sources in his Notes, supplemented by some material from interviews he conducted, and with these he does a creditable job supporting his depiction of crucial developments. For example, he documents how the U.S. ended up keeping troops stationed in Saudia Arabia after cessation of Gulf War combat even though the kingdom had been promised all American military would depart. And, the author emphasizes that pressures on the Bush administration to do something about ethnic cleansing in the Balkans distracted American officials to a point that Saddam could take advantage. However, despite a fluent treatment of what actually happened, Alfonsi tends to stay on the surface. Apparently, he doesn't have evidence for a deeper dig into the reasons people such as Defense Secretary (later Vice President) Dick Cheney did opinion 180s: Cheney stated in April 1991 that "It makes no sense at all" to embroil American troops in "a civil war inside Iraq." He said it would "literally be a quagmire." Yet, Alfonsi relates that in 2000 just after Bush and Cheney were declared the official winners of the election, Cheney said at a celebration dinner that now something could finally be done about removing Saddam Hussein. Huh? True, Saddam had been a thorn in the side of American power since the Gulf War, but the rising conviction of neoconservatives and those they could persuade that Iraq must have a new leader seems disproportional to his provocations. Perhaps the neoconservatives presumed that U.S. military power was so overwhelmingly superior that any target could be permanently vanquished without much American bloodshed or lengthy engagements. But -- again, probably because evidence is not readily available -- Alfonsi documents the jumps in key officials' (such as Cheney's) thoughts without thoroughly dissecting how they evolved.
CIRCLE IN THE SAND is, therefore, not a complete study of "why we went back to Iraq." But it does shine a steady light on some vital causes. And Alfonsi does not shrink from pointing out that al-Qaeda was born at least partially due to American activity in Saudi Arabia during the Bush I years, and that after 9/11 the Bush II administration allowed the chance to corner Bin Laden and other top-level al-Qaeda members to slip through their fingers largely because they considered Saddam Hussein and an invasion of Iraq a higher priority even though Iraq could not be convincingly connected to the 9/11 attacks.
Recommended.
Good Background on the First Gulf War April 15, 2007
Alfonsi was perhaps in a unique position to be researching the first Gulf War prior to and then during the planning of the second. In the 1992-2000 interim, the principals were accessible and open. Little did they know they would again be in a position to again affect policy in this region.
Alfonsi succeeds in his Woodward style reconstruction of Gulf I and its immediate aftermath. He informs, or reminds, of the time lines, April Glaspie's reports, the role of Joe Wilson, the build up, the acceptable range of Iraqi aggression, the support of the neighboring states, the diplomacy surrounding the Saudi bases, and the disastrous impact of Pres Bush 41's exhortation to the Iraqis to rise up against Hussein. The Gulf War I part of the book is 5 star and above for its documentation of history.
Also given good coverage is the impact of this war and the situation in Bosnia and how the two converged in the 1992 presidential campaign from the point of view of the Iraq War principals.
Alfonsi's segue into the 2003 Iraq invasion is disappointing. This last arc of the circle takes less than 50 pages. He says "it was in the DNA" of the Bush 43 administration. This does not explain why we went back.
While in the part of the first Gulf War Alfonsi clearly defines the role of oil, the discussion of oil is totally absent from the second. Neither does he explain how the then Secretary of Defense and cheerleader for leaving SH in place at the end of Gulf I, totally changes to hawk as Vice Pres. These are only a few of the missing pieces that subsequent researchers will undoubtedly explore.
Great book but key issues omited.... April 1, 2007
Circle in the Sand is reader-friendly research that brings some light on how the same folks that held Saddam Hussein in power after Desert Storm ended up involved in a civil war and a nation building effort a decade later.
The need to contain "estable" the Persian gulf, the distraction of the U.S. foreing policy on the Balkans crisis, the Republican defeat in 1992, the change of guard on the GOP leadership, the asscent of neoconservatives to power, the events of 9/11 and the perverse skill of an iraqi dictator to take advantage of the U.S. internal political conflicts are all combined to explain the constrast between the outcome of both wars.
Although comprehensive and convincing, Alfonsi's work omits an important force driving American troops back to Iraq. The quest for reliable and profitable source of energy as well as the defense industry interest on the conflict are not remotely mentioned as a reason on Why we went back to Iraq. Despite the omision, the book is worth reading not once but twice.
Dynastic Obsessions March 13, 2007
From Christian Alfonsi's lucid account of how Bush Jr. reprised and expanded Bush Sr.'s Iraq war, at least one horrifying lesson emerges: the dynastic obsessions of a family in power can throw the state into turmoil as easily today as in the days of the Caesars, Borgias and Hapsburgs. Conceived by a cabal of the father's consiglieri, whose self-serving and often self-deluding representations Alfonsi carefully recounts, this descent into the disaster belied all the safeguards of representative government as well as the inertial conservation of modern society's lumbering institutions. Historians in the 19th century wrote narratives of great men--heroes and villains alike. Although that type of history has gone out of fashion, it is still the right story in certain circumstances and this is one. Everyone should recall this book's story whenever families and their retainers seek power, regardless of their party affiliations.
 Thorough and convincing February 10, 2007
2 out of 2 found this review helpful
This is a superb account about how George H. W. Bush and his team won the 1991 Gulf War, and how (and why) Saddam Hussein prevailed in the subsequent decade. Alfonsi's intent was to write a book on the 1991 Gulf War; not only did he have access to recently unclassified material, but he received cooperation from most of the architects of the Bush I Adminstration's foreign policy. Because he did the bulk of his research well before George W Bush became president and at a time when the architects of the 1991 Gulf War thought their public service was over, those he interviewed were undoubtedly more candid and less concerned with a "CYA mentality" than they would be if interviewed today. His sources consist primarily of the recently unclassified memoranda and interviews. The heroes of his recounting are George H. W. Bush and Brent Scowcroft.
I do not know why this account of the relationship between the 1991 Gulf War and the current War in Iraq has not received more publicity and a wider audience, but his conclusion is well supported by his sources: "All wars are inherently political acts. But the Bush Administration decision to invade Iraq in 2005 was more political than most, a war of choice waged by a generation of officials who had been indelibly scarred by their experiences in an earlier Bush Administration. . . . . The war against the Taliban and al-Queda in Afghanistan was a just, necessary war and proportionate response to 9/11. The war in Iraq was none of these things."
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